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IS ETHICS POSSIBLE?
IN REPLY TO MR. ANTONIO LLANO.
BY THE EDITOR.
ANTONIO LLANO, a philosopher of very outspoken vievv^s,
has made his mark both as an author and an editor. His
monthly magazine, El Pensamiento Contemporcijieo, which was de-
voted to philosophy, history, and science, contained Spanish trans-
lations of articles by the most noted men of our time, Tyndall,
Maudsley, Huxley, Sayce, Wallace, G. J. Romanes, Spencer,
Crispi, Andrew D. White, John Stallo, F. Max Miiller, Mivart,
Prince Kropotkin, Ingersoll, and others ; and Mr. Llano's own
books deal with philosophical, ethical, and religio-philosophical
problems.^ I am glad that a man of Mr. Llano's calibre takes an
interest in the philosophj^ of The Open Coicrt and The Monist, but
regret to see that in his attempts at being consistent, he becomes
one-sided, and that through following his one-sided line of thought
he is not aware of the inconsistencies to which his aspiration of
being rigidly logical leads him.
Mr. Llano claims to be a consistent Spinozist, and his Spino-
zism is more Spinozistic than that of Spinoza himself. He be-
lieves in absolute determinism which, in his opinion, is identical
with fatalism, involving a surrender of both the freedom of will
and of morality. In his philosophy there is no room for "the
possible." Logical possibility is based upon assumptions and ac-
tual possibility is limited to reality. Everything not real is impos-
sible, for the course of the world's evolution is predetermined in
its minutest details. Ethics is therefore built upon a fallacy : the
ought presupposes the can, but there is only the must. ''A scoun-
drel is as necessarily a scoundrel as a horse is a horse." From
"^El Cristianismo ante La Filosofia, La Moraly La Historia.
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this standpoint, which is a most rigid fatalism, Mr. Llano charges
me with inconsistency, which, as he declares, is due to a conflict be-
tween feeling and judgment. If I were not biassed by heredity and
tradition, I should see that there are no such things as right and
wrong and that my system of ethics is built upon an assumption.
In reply I shall briefly state my reasons for believing in ethics and
in the reality of the moral ought.
Let us first recapitulate the problem of free will, for here the
root of our difference lies.
Freedom of will is a condition in which a man can do as he
pleases, and it is a matter of course that in such a case he will ne-
cessarily act according to his character. Is that incompatible with
determinism ? Not at all ! If the wills of certain people are free,
an honest man will unhesitatingly resist temptation, while a thief
under the very same conditions will steal. All actions, which result
from the specific character of a man, are actions of his own and of
his free will ; and yet they are performed with necessity according
to the irrefragable law of cause and effect.
It may be that Mr. Llano will object to this definition of free
will, because he defines free will as a will that is not determined at
all. To Vvfhich objection I reply that I, too, reject that kind of free
will ; but I submit that a will which is not determined at all, not
even by its own nature, is not a free will, but pure haphazard.
Such a conception of free will is nonsensical; and, in addition,
such a kind of free will, if it existed, far from being an indispensa-
ble condition of ethics, would make all ethics futile. What would
be the use of trying to influence men by preaching ethics and by
building up character if a man's decisions were not determined by
his character?
Mr. Llano has the right to propose for his own philosophy any
definition of free will he likes ; but if he wishes to understand me,
he must at least for the time being accept my definition, which re-
gards that will as free which enjoys the liberty of acting according
to its own nature.
If this definition of free will be granted, it will be readily seen
that freedom permeates nature in all its domains. When zinc is
dissolved in hydrochloric acid (HCl), the acid is decomposed, its
chlorine unites with the zinc, forming chloride of zinc (ZnCl),
whilst its hydrogen escapes in a gaseous form. The elements
act in strict agreement with their nature, but not because there
is a power that forces them to combine and separate. If the zinc
were endowed with consciousness and speech, it would say, " I like
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to join the chlorine"; and the chlorine would avow, "Zinc is pre-
ferable to hydrogen." It is possible that the hydrogen would feel
the smart of a jilted lover ; but, then, it mixes with the air and is
quickly comforted, for it will soon find another consort.
While it is a stretch of imagination to impute human senti-
ments to the chemical elements, there are, nevertheless, certain
analogies between psychical and non-psychical phenomena, and
the most obvious resemblance consists in the difference of primary
and secondary movements. Primary movements have their ground
in a quality of the moving thing, as the falling stone and the com-
bination of oxygen with carbon into carbonic acid in the flame, etc.
Secondary movements are due to push or pull, which is an exter-
nal influence or impulse, as the stone thrown up and the cart drawn
by a horse. Primary movements are acts of liberty, secondary
movements are acts performed under constraint against the nature
of the moving bodies. The needle of a magnet points toward the
north spontaneously, for it is the nature of magnetised iron to ad-
just its position in conformity to the magnetic currents of the earth
;
but if the needle be pushed aside and is turned toward the south
it suffers violence ; and if it could feel its condition and express it
in words, it would complain of compulsion.
So long as the character of a thing remains the same its pri-
mary motions will be the same under the same conditions ; and if
the character be changed, as for instance by magnetising a piece of
iron, its behavior will change accordingly.
Mr. Llano is apparently under the illusion, which is very com-
mon among philosophers, that the laws of nature are m.etaphysical
entities, and he believes that to them is given dominion over all
things in heaven and on earth. Thus the cosmic order which is con-
stituted by their harmony does not appear to him grand and beau-
tiful, but awful and oppressive. He says :
"In whatever direction we turn, the austere and implacable monster of Neces-
sity rises before us, proclaiming, by his very silence, that he is the eternal and,
therefore, the irrevocable. He cannot be moved, for he has no heart ; nor con-
vinced, for he has no brain ; he is an automaton made of inflexible material ; and
if we recognise him as our master, we must be satisfied to watch in submissive res-
ignation the everlasting motions of the wonderful and awful mechanism."
Natural laws are not tyrants ; they are not powers which dom-
inate over things and creatures ; the laws of nature are formulas
which describe the actions of objects according to their nature so
as to make it possible to foredetermine the results of given condi-
tions. Determinism does not mean that the various things are com-
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pelled by an external force ; it means that there is stability and reg-
ularity in nature. Thus the law of gravitation is only a compre-
hensive statement of the actions of gravitating bodies. The stone
does not fall to the ground at the bidding of Newton's formula, but
on account of its own gravity.
Mr. Llano's monster of Necessity is the child of an antiquated
metaphysicism ; it is bred in the close air of the philosopher's
study, and will never be believed by those who feel the thrill of
real life in their hearts. But suppose he could infuse this idea into
the artist, the inventor, the poet, the man who dares to do and to
achieve, would it not quench the fire of their youth? Would they
not turn away in submissive resignation from their own aspirations
at the thought that whatever happens takes place according to irre-
vocable laws : that Moloch Necessity is everything ; we are noth-
ing but tools in his hands ?
Necessity has two meanings : (i) inevitableness or determin-
ableness, meaning that which unfailingly will be,^ and (2) compul-
sion, a condition by which something is forced or compelled to
act in a certain way by somae external power. If necessity is to
be identified with compulsion we had better abandon determin-
ism as a superstition which is as untrue in theory as it is baneful
in practical life, and speak simply of the describableness of the
course of future events in the measure of our knowledge of the na-
ture of things.
That every single particle of the world is ensouled with free-
dom, that it acts differently under different conditions, but always ac-
cording to its nature, is an important truth which we should never
lose sight of; but its true significance increases with the unfoldment
of organised life. With the appearance of consciousness the pow-
ers of nature reach a higher stage of freedom having new poten-
tialities ; and, choice having been made possible, right and wrong,
goodness and badness, virtue and vice are introduced. That in-
difference of all actions of which Mr. Llano speaks does not exist
in the world of conscious life. With cognition, necessarily the pos-
sibility of error originates, and thus when the blind impulses of in-
organic nature rise into the realm of conscious aspiration we have
sin and righteousness.
Mr. Llano is under a radical misapprehension of facts when he
claims that between the action of Jesus and Judas Iscariot there is
no difference of kind but "only of degree," because the immoral is
iThe word is composed of ne, the negation, and of a derivative from cedere, to go away, signi-
fying that which will not disappear, that which will stay.
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in his opinion merely "a state of relative undevelopment. " We
might as well say that there is no error in the world, for error is
merely a state of less developed truth ; that there is no missing an
aim, for missing is simply a state of not yet having reached a place.
Failures and mistakes, however, do not originate by mere differ-
ences of degree ; they are instances of following a wrong direc-
tion. Evil, error, vice, sin, are not merely negative quantities
;
they are positive factors as much as virtues, knowledge, and noble
achievements. If I say 2+2^5 and act accordingly, it is not merely
a not-yet-completed but a wrong computation.
While it is quite true that a criminal is the product of condi-
tions and can to that extent as little help being a criminal as a
horse can help being a horse, it is not true that for that reason the
distinction between badness and goodness ceases. A diamond can
help being a diamond as little as glass can help being glass, but for
that reason a piece of glass is not of the same value as a diamond.
To understand how a criminal has become a criminal will no
doubt make those who judge his deeds considerate and compas-
sionate, but it will be no argument for looking upon him as a
saint or letting his crimes go unrebuked. On the other hand, a
genius has no reason for boasting. He, too, is the product of con-
ditions. The doctrine that we are by God's grace what we are has
acquired a new sense in the light of scientific considerations.^
The scientific view taken of crime and virtue is the begin-
ning of a new era in mankind, which was anticipated in the East
by Buddha and in the West by Christ. Our judiciary is not as
yet administered from the Buddhist-Christian point of view, but
follows the principle of retaliation. Instead of treating crime as a
disease, we punish crime. Instead of educating the criminal and
creating conditions under which the disease of immorality will be
cured we torture him, well knowing that this method has the ten-
dency of ruining him altogether. The times, however, are chang-
ing now. Our penal code is slowly being adapted to the new
world-conception, and the criminal condemned to die is no longer
tortured as in former centuries, but executed with as little pain as
possible.
1 Buddhism speaks of the time of grace in somewhat the same sense as Christianity. When
we receive instruction that is beneficial and leads us on the path of salvation to Nirvana it is
no merit of ours, but a grace that is offered us, as we read in the Jataka tales :
" If in this present time of Grace
You fail to reach the happy state,
Long will you suffer deep remorse."
—Trans, by T. W. Rhys Davids, p. 157.
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It is true, as Mr. Llano says, that ''we are natural phenom-
ena"; but we are not blind or unconscious things; we are sentient
beings. Sentiency and corporeal objectivity are two abstractions
representing different qualities of the same reality. As such they
are radically distinct but not separate. Every subjective feeling is
the psychical aspect of a cerebral commotion ; and as every cere-
bral commotion possesses a definite form, so every feeling is dis-
tinct in kind. The objectivity of the world can thus, according to
the varying forms of objects, be impressed upon the subjectivity of
sentient organisms, and a sight-sensation of a definite form grows
by repetition to represent the object that causes it. The sub-
jectivity of the human soul is practically a comprehensive inven-
tory of the surrounding world and its relations, serving as a guide
through life or as a means of adaptation to conditions. In other
words, the form of subjectivity is the product of objective influ-
ences.
The things of the inorganic world act according to their nature
and so do living animal organisms. But the nature of living animal
organisms does not consist of purely mechanical or chemical prop-
erties ; they exhibit a new feature, which is called mentality or the
representative value of feelings. The animal mind is determined
in its actions by ideas and not by pull or push or chemical affinity.
Now it is the appearance of consciousness in the cosmic evo-
lution which renders ethics possible. A thinking being is not like
a stone; it does not follow the first impulse; a thinking being de-
liberates before it acts, and comes at last to a decision which is ex-
ecuted. This is a higher phase of freedom, for it adds the possi-
bility of choice, and man, the animal of abstract thought, can form
ideals of a state of things, not as it is, but as it ought to be.
Mr. Llano will make an objection here. He will say that in
the realm of the soul the same determinism obtains that rules in
the domain of purely physical phenomena. Now I grant that psy-
chical phenomena are as much determined as physical phenomena ;
but here as there we are confronted with freedom. There is only
this difference, that that which determines the decision of a man is
his character. Ideas are the factors and the responsiveness of ideas
consists of other qualities than mechanical push and chemical affin-
ity. It is true that the strongest idea will prevail over weaker ideas,
but the strength of ideas cannot be measured in foot-pounds. The
strength of ideas depends upon various other factors, among which
the conviction of their truth is perhaps the most important one.
The appearance of the soul is not a break in nature, but the
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product of a natural evolution. That the continuity from the form-
ation of crystals to the aspirations of huxTian beings is uninterrupted
is not an evidence of man's degradation, but on the contrary it
proves that the world as a whole is more than a haphazard con-
glomeration of matter in motion. There is a teleoarchy^ of some
kind—a cosmic order which prompts aspirations in a definite direc-
tion. This teleoarchy works blindly in the lower spheres of nature
and acquires consciousness in man. Man is himself a natural phe-
nomenon ; but he is a phenomenon in which the eternal conditions
of being can be reflected. Thus the transient can become a mirror
that pictures the immutable; the particular can comprehend the
universal; that which is conditional can grasp its own conditions
and trace them back to the unconditioned order of existence.
The old supernaturalism which assumes that some extramun-
dane personality, power, or entity enters into the natural world by
a break of the cosmic order, has become untenable; but for that
reason we need not deny the existence of the moral tendencies that
manifest themselves in the world-process. We propose a new su-
pernaturalism, which believes that the potentialities of a stwsum,
of an aspiration to rise higher, are contained in the natural. Man
forms a higher empire in nature which is above the physical. It is
true that obedience to the law that conditions man's evolution con-
stitutes morality, but the highest morality imaginable is a state of
mind in which man's sentiments have become an incarnation of
the world-order. The man who is obedient to the laws of morality
still feels himself the subject or slave of a power which he appre-
hends to be stronger than himself. But he can so love justice,
righteousness, kindness, charity, that his v/hole nature is deter-
mined by these qualities. He can become an incarnation of these
aspirations, so as to be identified with them. That is the state of
heait which characterised the Buddha ideal of the Buddhists, and
that is the gist of the ethics preached by Christ, There is no longer
any need of requesting obedience to the moral law of a man whose
sentiments are aglow with it and whose will is bent on realising it.
According to Mr. Llano, every man is the product of condi-
tions, and we are what we are by necessity; therefore, the must
governs us, and there is no sense in speaking of the ought. The
premise is true, the conclusion is wrong. Mr. Llano forgets that
IThe old teleology, whose workings are extraneous, is wrong; the world has not been de-
signed like a watch ; there is not a demiurge who in. the fashion of a human artifex constructed
the universe. But there is an intrinsic teleoarchy, an orderly arrangement of the actions that
take place in the world, the nature of which is most obviously apparent in the harmony of math-
ematics.
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the ought, the ideal, by which a man allows himself to be guided,
is also a factor and, indeed, a most important factor among the de-
termining causes. One of the conditions that make a man is his
own thought. A man who cherishes the idea of his responsibility
will act differently from the man who imagines that he is irrespon-
sible. The idea that we are unfree, that we are products of chance
and helplessly doomed to be determined by conditions, is oppres-
sive (as Mr. Llano's case proves), while the thought of our respon-
sibility gives strength and rouses us to vigorous action. The man
inspired with the idea of responsibility will investigate and try to
learn, the man who thinks he is unfree will be indifferent and pas-
sive. Considering the importance of ideas, as the determining fac-
tors of man's actions, is it not necessary to devote a special study
to the subject for the sake of distinguishing between wholesome
and injurious ideas?
In ethics we ask which ideas are wholesome and which injuri-
ous, and the answer in brief is that the truth is wholesome and un-
truth injurious. There is no need here of entering into details, for
the question has been discussed repeatedly, and we shall emphasise
the fact only that truth does not mean mere correctness of knowl-
edge but also and mainly truthfulness of heart.
Ethics would be futile if man's action did not depend upon his
beliefs and habits. Since his beliefs and habits are the main deter-
minant factors of his fate for his own personal good as well as that
of the whole race, ethics is as necessary for human conduct in gen-
eral as mechanics is indispensable for mechanical engineering.
Indeed, ethics belongs to the necessities of life, it is the bread of
life, and a wrong ethics is not less injurious than poison that is
used for food.
Mr. Llano declares that ''the ethical ought is erected on an
assum.ption of some kind,—on an //". " Ethics has sense only for
him who desires to attain the aim and end of ethical aspirations,
not for him who has other ends, or no end at all.
This same objection was made to ethics as a science years ago
from another standpoint. Mr. Salter in defence of intuitionist
ethics granted that a scientific inquiry into facts may teach moral-
ity to him who longs for truth and for a life of truth, "but," says
he, "the fact is that we may desire other things."
My answer to Mr. Llano is the same as it was to Mr. Salter.
"The ultimate question of ethics is not, what we desii-e but what is
desired of us.''^
When we want to have truth, we must drop our personal likes
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and dislikes. Exact science eliminates the subjective and aims at
a purely objective statement of facts. He who wants to think cor-
rectly must leave aside the I's and the me's. It is no exaggeration
to say that the intrusion of self is always the main source of error.
While it is wise to drop all I's and pie's, we grant that the
world is full of them, and we must take their presence into consid-
eration. And who can deny that the thwarted endeavors of self-
willed men teach us a most impressive lesson?
The man who desires pleasures and does not stop to think
what is desired of him, may have, for a time at least, pleasures ; but
then he must take all the consequences of his actions. The man
who delights in crime may actually commit crime, but the evils that
result from crime will come not only upon those against whom he
trespasses, but finally upon himself also. A truly scientific ethics
knows of no assumptions ; it gives information as to the conse-
quences of deeds; and the sufferings of life, including the final dis-
solution of ourselves in death, set us to thinking how we can es-
cape evil. Here the answers may be many, but there is one only
which I deem to be right, it is the answer of Buddha and of Christ,
both being practically the same, and these injunctions are substan-
tially the same that are taught by the ethics of science. According
to Buddha it is the eightfold noble path of righteousness that leads
to salvation, implying an extermination of all selfishness, hatred,
and passion, which are the three roots of all evil. And Christ says
:
"A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another" (John, 13,
34), and, "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you" (Matth., 5, 44, and
Luke, 6, 35).
There is a time in the cosmic evolution when consciousness
originates; and there is again a time when the idea of self in its
full contrast to the not-self dav/ns upon consciousness. But then
again comes a time when the relation of the self to the whole be-
gins to be understood. That is the origin of ethics, and that is the
meaning when people become anxious about themselves, about
their soul, about their fate and the destiny of their lifework after
death. Then such questions are asked, What shall I do to enter
life eternal? These aspirations are a transition which lead from
the question, "What do I desire?" to the other question, "What
is desired of me? " There is no assumption whatever in scientific
ethics. He who does not ask the question, "What is desired of
me?" will remain stagnant at a certain phase of his evolution and
will reap the consequences of his thoughtlessness. He is compar-
able to the anthropoid who does not want to become man. He will
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either remain what he is, if that be possible, or share the fate of
the unprogressive anthropoid : his name will be blotted out from
the book of life.
There is this peculiarity about ethics, that there are many
roads leading to it. The man who longs for happiness will find
that there is no absolute happiness possible, and the best thing he
can do is to drop altogether his hankering after pleasures and
lead a moral life. On this basis a hedonistic ethics is possible. A
man v/ho is egotistic and ambitious will find that there is no success
in life possible except he surrender his vanity. And on this basis
an ethics of egotism can be erected. All these different methods,
insufficient though they may be, lead practically to the same con-
clusion, pointing beyond the self of man and teaching him to seek
a purpose higher than his limited life and individuality.
The new solution of the problem of self (which in detail has
been explained elsewhere) brings about a radical change of attitude,
for upon the proper solution of the psychological problem all other
problems of philosoph)^ religion, and ethics depend. The new
conception of self destroys the illusion of the limitedness and nar-
rowness of self as held by the psychologists of the old school, and
shows us the human soul as the divine incarnation of the eternal
prototype of rationality and moral endeavor, revealing both its
whence in the past and its whither in the future.
The self in the old sense is destroyed and with it the vanit)^ of
all selfishness. But there is a new self which takes the place of the
old limited self; and the new self is infinite in its potentialitj^, for
the new self identifies itself with the eternal conditions of exist-
ence. Our eyes are opened, and we discern those subtle influences
which build up the structure of our soul and are as invisible to the
uninitiated as for instance the geometrical proportions of the barn
or the meadow are nonentities to the sheep.
If it is true, as Master Eckhart says, that man is what he lov-
eth, the new self is truth incarnate, for it loveth truth above every-
thing, and consists in the endeavor of living out the truth, realising
it more and more in comprehension as well as in practical applica-
tion. The old Adam must go, and the new Adam is a higher man,
no longer a particular ego but divinity incarnate, no longer an iso-
lated individual but the universal realised, the ideal that has be-
come flesh.
The main ideas underlying the ethics of Christianity are true,
but the commonly accepted church-dogmas and their interpreta-
tions are wrong. As useful inventions generally precede scientific
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comprehension, so the precepts of practical morality were discov-
ered long before our sages could explain the psychological basis of
these apparent paradoxes. The Religion of Science is needed be-
cause science is sufficiently advanced to day to catch up with re-
ligion. Religion (practically applied religion, as taught by Lao-
Tsze, the Buddha, the Prophets, and Christ) was in advance of
science by more than two millenniums, and it is the science of re-
ligion or theology that is unprogressive. Not that theology is wrong
in principle, but it is slow in accomplishing its task. Not that we
must have less theology or science in religion, but more. Not that
we must abolish science in religion, but we must perfect it. For
science (i. e., genuine science, not the one-sided productions of the
average sciolist) is the comforter that illumines the world and
brings about the fulfilment, the 7i\i]pd)6i'S, so dearly longed for by
St. John and the early Christians.
* *
Mr. Llano discovers the source of what he is pleased to call
the inconsistencies of Developmental Ethics in "the law of the
conflict between feeling and judgment." He says:
"The nature of this law will be readily seen by an illustration. A nervous
woman may take the five cartridges out of the five chambers of a pistol, count them
and hold them in her hand ; and yet, if the weapon be pointed at her, she will
scream with fright, and not improbably faint away. Her judgment, it is evident,
tells her, beyond all doubt, that it is impossible that any harm should come to her
from the unloaded weapon ; but her deeply rooted feelings, organised by heredity
or by association, or both, unavoidably impel her to act in opposition to her correct
judgment."
Mr. Llano forgets that sentiments are very important factors
in the makeup of man's soul. To disregard our feelings for the
sake of some logical argument would be as wrong as to be swayed
by feelings alone without subjecting them to a careful analysis and
revision. Man's sentiments are the sediment of an immeasurably
long chain of experiences, partly inherited, partly personal, and
are of too great importance to be neglected or to be regarded as
utterly without foundation. Our sentiments are sometimes more
reliable than our logical deductions in which we are too apt to omit
an important factor. Thus, for instance, in the illustration which
Mr. Llano proposes, we should decidedly object to a behavior such
as he mentions, and far from blaming the woman who screams
when an unloaded revolver is pointed at her, we blame the man
who handles the revolver carelessly. Almost all the accidents that
happen are due to toying with weapons which were supposed not
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to be loaded. I know of a case in which two brothers, who have
great experience with guns, had unloaded a revolver the construc-
tion of which they investigated, and one pointed it at the other,
when all of a sudden the revolver went off, and the ball went right
through the head of the other boy, entering near the nose and com-
ing out near the ear. The young man, an officer of the militia, as-
sured me that he could conscientiously declare on oath that to his
knowledge there could not have been a shot in the revolver. He
added, "It was a lesson that I shall never forget." Fortunately,
the bullet did not kill his brother, and after several weeks of suffer-
ing he recovered without any serious injury, leaving only a small
mark on his face. But not all cases end so happily, and it is advis-
able for every one to mind sentiments, because they sometimes
represent the influence of factors overlooked in so-called scientific
expositions which are seemingly faultless, and, so far as pure logic
is concerned, unquestionably correct.
*
And now in conclusion I may be allowed to discuss briefly a
point not mentioned by Mr. Llano, which, however, is closely con-
nected with the subject.
We, understand that ethics as a science is the product of a con-
tinuous evolution; we know that the religious leaders in the world
have found the right solution instinctively. As a genius makes an
important invention, or as a poet finds by inspiration the word that
thrills thousands of hearts, so the moral teachers of mankind taught
lessons of highest morality at a time when their truth was so far
from being scientifically comprehensible that it appeared paradox-
ical—naturally so, for it is paradoxical from the old standpoint.
The great unknown inventor of the wheel was not familiar with
the science of applied mechanics as it is developed in our tim.e, but
he is one of those that laid the basis of it, and his invention is still
the corner-stone in that grand edifice. The same is true in ethics of
him who first proclaimed the law of love and charity. The souls
of these men are with us to-day, constituting the kingdom that is
within us. We are the continuance of aspirations that began long
before we were born.
Considering the close connexion of the present with the past,
we prefer reform to rescission and deem a purification of the tradi-
tional religious conceptions better than abandoning them. It is
true that the words God, soul, immortality, and religion have be-
come new ; they have become more definite, more exact and less
mythological, but that is exactly what must be expected. History
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is a change and a growth. He that sat upon the throne said
:
<'.... But behold, I make all things new ! "
I know that at present both the conservatives and the liberals
look with suspicion upon this method of pouring new wine into old
bottles, but the time will come when they will understand it. The
situation may be briefly explained by a simile. There were in for-
mer times people who believed in mathematics as if it consisted of
lines and circles and other figures that v/ere living in heaven and
came down from time to time upon earth in a miraculous way for
the sake of helping poor mortal man, calculating distances, erect-
ing buildings, constructing bridges, tunnelling mountains, and other
feats of engineering. But a schism arose : there were men who de-
clared that mathematics did not exist at all and that every belief in
mathematics was a superstition. There was one among them who
said that mathematical truths (if they deserve the name at all), so
far from being true, are actually wrong ; they are ''purely mental "
and refer to "purely imaginary objects." He claimed "there ex-
"ist no points without magnitudes; no lines without breadth, nor
"perfectly straight ; no circles with all their radii exactly equal, nor
"squares with all their angles perfectly right." Believing that
"the points, lines, circles, and squares" which the mathematician
"has in his mind are simple copies of the points, lines, circles, and
"squares which he has known in his experience," he claimed that
the science of mathematics consists of "assumptions" which are
not only faulty but even "inconceivable." This viev/ was actually
defended by Mr. John Stuart Mill,^ and it characterises most drastic-
ally and consistently the attitude of all negativism, drawing the ulti-
mate conclusions of the main tenets of the nominalistic philosophy.
Such is also the contrast between the parties of the conser-
vatives and freethinkers. The conservatives believe that God is
a being; some freethinkers declare that God does not exist at all.
There is on the one hand a literal belief in a traditional mythology,
and on the other hand a flat denial of the truths of religion. Now I
take the liberty to differ from Mr. John Stuart Mill. I believe in
mathematics, and I believe that the definitions of and theorems
concerning mathematical lines designate truths which are not only
real but super-real. I do not believe that they are beings of any
kind who lead a life of bliss somev.^here in heaven ; they are not
corporeal, nor do they possess astral bodies; still less can they be
said to be metaphysical entities. Nevertheless they are not non-
existent, for they are the eternal relations that apply to any possi-
1 See John Stuart Mill's System ofLogic, 8th edition, Chapter V., pp. 168, et seq.
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ble world ; they are absolute truths whose being is indestructible
and whose existence is the law that conditions the formation of
every particular existence.
The same is true of God. The believer in the letter of his
mythology looks upon the views editorially upheld in T/ie Open
Court, as atheistic ; and the freethinker criticises them for making
compromises with superstition. Nevertheless, we are serious in
saying that the average atheist is wrong in flatly denying the ex-
istence of God, while the old-fashioned believer is a pagan—that
is to say, a man who believes in the letter of a myth and has no
idea of its significance ; he surrenders the substance for the vessel
in which it is contained ; he loses the reality by holding on to its
shadov/.
This position is a reconciliation of two contrasts, but it is not a
compromise. It gives to science what belongs to science, and to
ethics what belongs to ethics. By making ethics a science applied
to practical life, it shows us the truth of the old religious ideals in
a new light ; it renders it possible for us to grasp with scientific
comprehension what our fathers were feeling after, groping in the
dark for. And this is what we call The Religion of Science.
